Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Leu v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided March 25, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a person does not lose their status as a "passenger" in a motor vehicle unless they take some action that makes the motor vehicle a source of danger to themselves or others.

Jennifer Leu was a passenger in a pickup truck driven by her husband. A police officer stopped the pickup and suspected Leu's husband was impaired. After conducting field sobriety tests on Leu’s husband, the officer arrested him and directed Leu to remain in the truck. The truck’s engine remained running. At some point, Leu got out of the passenger compartment of the truck and moved to the driver’s seat. However, she did not close the driver’s door. Instead, Leu sat sideways on the driver’s seat, with her feet hanging out of the truck. When the officer observed Leu in that position, she was on her cell phone and explained to the officer that she was requesting a ride home from the scene. Leu exited the truck. Then, she reached inside the truck, switched off the ignition, and put the keys in her pocket. As the officer placed Leu under arrest, a third party arrived to take possession of the truck.

Jennifer Leu's drivers license was revoked for being in physical control of a motor vehicle.  Ms. Leu filed a challenge to the revocation but the district court upheld the revocation. On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals rightly reversed the district court, stating:

"The term “physical control” is more comprehensive than the terms “drive” and “operate.” State v. Harris, 202N.W.2d 878, 881 (Minn. 1972). The term “physical control” should be given “the broadest possible effect” to deter inebriated persons from getting into vehicles except as passengers. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Juncewski, 308N.W.2d 316, 319 (Minn. 1981) (quotation omitted). Generally, physical control is meant to cover situations in which “an inebriated person is found in a parked vehicle under circumstances where the car, without too much difficulty, might again be started and become a source of danger to the operator, to others, or to property.” State v. Starfield, 481 N.W.2d 834, 837 (Minn 1992)."

"However, [i]t is, of course, no crime for an intoxicated person to be in a motor vehicle as a passenger. A passenger, by definition, is someone who is merely along for the ride. When, however, only one person is found in or about a stopped car, the question arises whether that person is a passenger or a person in physical control of the motor vehicle. Mere presence in or about the vehicle is not enough for physical control; it is the overall situation that is determinative."

"Thus, the supreme court has articulated a different physical-control standard for a “known passenger” in Shane. 587 N.W.2d at 639. Under that standard: [F]or a police officer to have probable cause to believe a known passenger is in physical control of a motor vehicle, the officer must have reason to believe that the passenger has or is about to take some action that makes the motor vehicle a source of danger to themselves, to others, or to property."

***

"After the driver in Shane was removed from the vehicle, Shane asked the police officer if he could drive the vehicle home. Id. at 640. Later, Shane touched the vehicle’s gas pedal from his position in the passenger seat while the vehicle was running, causing the engine to “rev up” and the exhaust from the vehicle to increase. Id. at 642. Yet, the supreme court concluded that the officers “had no reason to believe that Shane had or was about to take some action that would make the [vehicle] a source of danger,” stating, “[t]he mere act of a known passenger leaning over and touching a vehicle’s gas pedal, without more, is not an action that makes the vehicle a source of danger.” Id. The Shane court said that the circumstances were inadequate to establish “physical control” because Shane did not put himself in a position to move the vehicle. Id. The supreme court noted that Shane did not cause the vehicle to move, did not move to the driver’s seat, did not touch the steering wheel, and did not put the vehicle into gear. Id. Nor was there any evidence that Shane attempted to do those things. Id. Thus, the officers did not have probable cause to believe that Shane was in physical control of the vehicle. Id."

"When compared to the circumstances in Shane, the circumstances here provide even less reason to believe that Leu had taken or was about to take some action to make the truck a danger to herself, others, or property. Like Shane, Leu did not put herself in a position to move the truck, and she did not cause the truck to move. Although Leu moved to the driver’s seat, she did not sit in a position conducive to driving. Instead, she sat facing out the driver’s door with her feet outside of the truck, where they were not in contact with the truck’s gas and brake pedals. Unlike Shane, Leu did not manipulate the gas pedal. Leu operated only the truck’s ignition switch, and she did so only to turn off the truck’s engine. Next, she removed the keys from the truck. Those acts are inconsistent with an attempt to move the truck. Finally, unlike Shane, Leu did not ask for permission to drive the truck. Instead, she attempted to make arrangements for a ride home, and a third party arrived and took custody of the truck before the police officer cleared the scene. When considered in their totality, these circumstances do not suggest that Leu had taken or was about to take some action to make the truck a danger to herself, others, or property."

***

"Because Leu was a known passenger and the totality of the circumstances do not indicate that she had taken or was about to take some action to make the truck a source of danger, there was no probable cause to believe that she was in physical control of the truck. We therefore reverse the commissioner’s revocation of Leu’s license to drive."

Moral Of The Story: Don't ride with a drunk driver.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Alleman v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided March 4, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that a partially covered license plate is a constitutionally sufficient reason for the police to stop a motor vehicle. 

In Alleman, a Crow Wing County police officer was following the Petitioner's motorcycle when the officer noticed Mr. Alleman's backpack was obstructing the rear license plate of the motorcycle.  The officer initiated a traffic stop and ultimately arrested Mr. Alleman for DWI and revoked his driver's license.

Mr. Alleman filed a challenge to the license revocation arguing the officer did not have a constitutionally sufficient basis to justify the initial stop.  The district court denied the challenge and upheld the license revocation.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, noting:

"...an officer does not violate the prohibition if [the officer] stops a vehicle to conduct an investigation based on the officer’s reasonable suspicion that the driver is engaging in criminal activity.” Soucie v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 957 N.W.2d 461, 463-64 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. June 29, 2021). Reasonable suspicion must be based on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see Magnuson v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 703 N.W.2d 557, 559 (Minn. App. 2005). “Generally, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.” State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004)."

***

"Under Minnesota Statutes section 169.79, subdivision 7 (2022), “[t]he person driving the motor vehicle shall keep the [license] plate legible and unobstructed ... so that the lettering is plainly visible at all times.” See Minn. Stat. § 169.011, subd. 44 (2022) (defining “motorcycle” as a “motor vehicle”). Based on the squad-car video, the district court found that it was “very clear that the backpack obstruct[ed] at least three quarters of the license plate.” Alleman disputes the district court’s finding that his license plate was obstructed by the backpack."

"Alleman contends that two screenshots from the squad-car video show that his license plate was not covered by the backpack before Officer Lindman stopped his motorcycle. But a review of the squad-car video plainly shows that the license plate was partially obstructed by the backpack before Officer Lindman stopped Alleman’s motorcycle. Because the record supports the district court’s finding that Alleman’s license plate was obstructed by the backpack, the district court did not err by concluding that Officer Lindman had reasonable suspicion to stop Alleman’s motorcycle."

Moral Of The Story: Be careful of what you are packing.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Obowa v. Commissioner of Public Safety, (Decided February 5, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands, once again, for the proposition that any vehicle equipment violation justifies the stop of the motor vehicle.

In Obowa, a law-enforcement officer with the Lino Lakes Public Safety Department was driving northbound on Lake Drive. A passenger vehicle was driving directly in front of the officer’s squad car. When the driver of the vehicle braked to stop for a red light, the officer observed that one of the vehicle’s brake lights was not working. The officer then initiated a traffic stop by pulling over the vehicle.

The officer spoke to the driver, James Obowa, and the officer could smelled the odor of alcohol, and observed Mr. Obowa exhibited bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. Further testing resulted in the arrest of Mr. Obowa for DWI and in the revocation of his driver's license.

Mr. Obowa challenged the license revocation but the district court sustained the revocation. On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the revocation, stating:

"A law enforcement officer may, however, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop of a motor vehicle when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). To satisfy the reasonable-suspicion standard, the officer “must articulate a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted)."

"In the traffic-stop context, the bar for reasonable suspicion is relatively low. See Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 752, 757. “Generally, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.” State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004)."

***

"Obowa challenges the district court’s determination that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to support the traffic stop. More specifically, Obowa contends that the district court’s decision is based on a mistake of law and a mistake of fact because the record does not reflect that the officer had an objective basis to suspect that Obowa was operating his vehicle in violation of a traffic law. Based on our review of the applicable traffic laws and the record in this case, we are not persuaded."

"Minnesota law requires that a vehicle’s stop lamps and signal lamps “must at all times be maintained in good working condition.” Minn. Stat. § 169.57, subd. 3(a) (2022). In State v. Beall, we clarified that the statute “unambiguously applies to all lamps with which a vehicle is equipped.” 771 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Minn. App. 2009) (emphasis added). We concluded that “[a] vehicle with an inoperable [] brake light is operated unlawfully in violation of [section 169.57, subdivision 3(a)].” Id. And we held that an officer’s observation of a violation of that statutory provision “gives rise to objective, reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying a traffic stop.” Id.

"Beall instructs that an officer’s mere observation of an inoperable brake light is sufficient to justify a traffic stop. See id. That is exactly what the officer testified to in this case. At the implied-consent hearing, he stated that “when the vehicle applied its brakes, the driver’s-side brake light was inoperable.” This testimony is sufficient to support the traffic stop based on a violation of section 169.57, subdivision 3(a). We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in its determination that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Obowa."

Moral Of The Story: An ill equipped car is like living with a snitch.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Waldron (Decided December 26, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that it is never a good idea to talk to the police.

In Waldron, the defendant approached a house in Hibbing Minnesota looking for held after a single-car crash.  Waldron was injured and smelled of alcohol, and the homeowners summoned emergency assistance. A state trooper was the first emergency worker to arrive. The trooper located the car, which was in a ditch about 40 yards away from the road, and he confirmed that it was unoccupied. Then, the trooper went to the house to meet with Ms. Waldron.

Waldron was lying on the entryway floor, bloodied, and crying, and the homeowners were nearby. The trooper called for an ambulance. When the trooper asked Waldron for her name, she did not respond and moaned in pain. The homeowners told the trooper that Waldron had told them her name and had said her boyfriend was the driver. When the trooper asked Waldron what she had been doing at the time of the crash and whether she had been wearing a seatbelt, Waldron said she was not driving and asked about her boyfriend’s whereabouts. The trooper radioed for assistance in locating the missing boyfriend.

Another officer arrived at the home, and asked Waldron for the name of the boyfriend they should be looking for. This officer asked Waldron whether the boyfriend had been driving. Waldron responded that her boyfriend was not the driver.

Ms. Waldron was taken to a local hospital and her blood was drawn pursuant to a search warrant.  The blood test result revealed an alcohol concentration level of .188%.

The Defendant was charged with DWI and moved to suppress the statements she had made to law enforcement arguing the statements were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona.

The district court denied the motion to suppress and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, noting:

"To determine whether an individual was in custody for the purpose of the Miranda requirement, a court should consider the surrounding circumstances. State v. Scruggs, 822 N.W.2d 631, 637 (Minn. 2012). Factors suggesting that a person was in custody include:

(1) the police interviewing the suspect at the police station;

(2) the suspect being told he or she is a prime suspect in a crime; (3) the police restraining the suspect[’]s freedom of movement; (4) the suspect making a significantly incriminating statement; (5) the presence of multiple officers; and (6) a gun pointing at the suspect.

State v. Vue, 797 N.W.2d 5, 11 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). And factors suggesting that an individual was not in custody include brief questioning, a nonthreatening environment, an explicit statement by police that the person is not under arrest, and police allowing the person to make phone calls or leave after they gave their statement. Scruggs, 822 N.W.2d at 637."

"Interrogation is “express questioning or any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” State v. Heinonen, 909 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. 2018) (quotations omitted). A custodial interrogation occurs when “questioning [is] initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her] freedom of action in any significant way,” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, or “if, based on all the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe that he or she was in police custody of the degree associated with formal arrest.” Vue, 797 N.W.2d at 10-11 (quotation omitted); see also Scruggs, 822 N.W.2d at 637."

***

"Based on the district court’s undisputed factual findings, we determine, based on our independent review, that there was no custodial interrogation requiring a Miranda warning. We reach this conclusion for two reasons.

First, considering the surrounding circumstances, Waldron was not in custody when she was questioned. At the outset of Waldron’s encounter with law enforcement—and, indeed, for the majority of that encounter—there was just one law enforcement officer present. The homeowners were also present during the encounter, and they were also interacting with law enforcement. Waldron was not in a police station, jail, or a squad car. She was lying on the floor of a house that she entered on her own initiative. And the responding trooper made clear that medical help had been summoned for Waldron. The questions posed by law enforcement were not accusatory. Rather, they were open-ended attempts to figure out what had happened and whether there was another injured person outside in the cold. The totality of these circumstances indicates that Waldron was not in custody when she made the statements at issue. See Vue, 797 N.W.2d at 11 (instructing district courts to consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether an individual is in custody for the purpose of a Miranda warning).

Second, there was no interrogation. Police are not required to give a Miranda warning when engaging in “general on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477. This includes “on-the-scene questioning” of individuals suspected of driving while under the influence. See Steinberg v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 357 N.W.2d 413, 416 (Minn. App. 1984) (“[U]pon arriving at the scene of an accident an officer need not give a Miranda warning to a person suspected of DWI.”); see also State v. Werner, 725 N.W.2d 767, 769-71 (Minn. App. 2007) (stating that asking a DWI suspect about alcohol consumption does not constitute an interrogation); State v. Herem, 384 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Minn. 1986) (observing that an “officer’s subjective intent or . . . belief that defendant was driving under the influence” does not on its own “necessitate a Miranda warning”). Here, law enforcement officers asked Waldron general on-the-scene questions after responding to a serious car accident. These questions did not amount to an interrogation."

"Because there was no custodial interrogation, no Miranda warning was required."

Moral Of The Story: Loose lips sink ships!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Ness v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided December 11, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the failure to read verbatim the Minnesota DWI Search Warrant Advisory is not fatal as long as the advisory given is not inaccurate, misleading or confusing.

In Ness, the Petitioner was arrested for driving while impaired and was taken to jail.  The arresting officer asked the Petitioner if he preferred to take a blood or a urine test. The Petitioner responded that the officer was not going to obtain either test from him.

The officer obtained a search warrant authorizing him to procure either a blood or urine sample from appellant. After obtaining the warrant, the officer approached Petitioner's holding cell, stated Petitioner's name, and asked Petitioner to come talk to him. Petitioner was lying down on the cell bed, was wrapped in a blanket with his eyes closed, and did not get up or respond to the officer. The officer informed Petitioner, “as I told you before, I was drafting a search warrant for your blood or urine because of the DWI, and I have a signed search warrant in my hand, and refusing to submit to that search warrant is a crime.” The officer asked Petitioner if he understood. The officer testified that appellant did not respond and was ignoring him, but that at one point Petitioner opened his eyes and looked at him while adjusting his blanket before continuing to ignore him.  The officer asked Petitioner if he was refusing to give the officer a test, to which Petitioner did not reply.

The officer then told Petitioner that he was taking his silence as a refusal, and asked if Petitioner understood. Petitioner again did not reply. The officer informed Petitioner that he was leaving Petitioner a copy of the search warrant but Petitioner's noncompliance with the warrant would be considered a refusal and he would be charged with an additional crime. The officer then issued a Notice and Order Of Revocation of the Petitioner's driver's license.

The Petitioner challenged the revocation of his license asserting that his refusal to submit to testing was not properly obtained.  Petitioner claimed that since the officer failed to read the search warrant advisory statutory language verbatim, and failed to offer both a blood or urine test, the revocation of his license must be rescinded.

The district court sustained the revocation and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the lower court, stating:

"Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 4. “At the time a blood or urine test is directed pursuant to a search warrant . . . the person must be informed that refusal to submit to a blood or urine test is a crime.” Id., subd. 1. 

"Minnesota Statutes section 171.177, subdivision 2, provides, in part, that:

The peace officer who directs a test pursuant to a search warrant shall direct a blood or urine test as provided in the warrant. If the warrant authorizes either a blood or urine test,     the officer may direct whether the test is of blood or urine. If the person to whom the test is directed objects to the test, the officer shall offer the person an alternative test of either blood or urine.

Action may only be taken against a person who is offered and refuses both a urine test and a blood test. Id., subd. 2."

"This court has determined that the warning requirement under Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, is unambiguous and law enforcement is required to inform a defendant that refusal to submit to a warranted blood or urine test is a crime. State v. Mike, 919 N.W.2d 103,110 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 20,2019)."

***

"In Nash, this court considered whether law enforcement provided the search-warrant advisory required under Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, when a state trooper told Nash, “I applied for a search warrant for a blood draw, and refusal to take a test is a crime.” 989 N.W.2d at 706. Even though the warrant also permitted a urine test, the trooper did not mention the possibility of a urine test, and Nash did not have an opportunity to read the warrant before agreeing to the blood test. Id. at 710. We concluded that “the advisory informed Nash that he could be charged with a crime if he refused the blood test, even though the trooper had not offered Nash an alternative urine test. That was an inaccurate statement of law and misleading,” and could not be a basis for Nash’s license revocation. Id. at 710-11. We held that if a search-warrant advisory deviates from the exact wording of Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, it “is insufficient to sustain the revocation of a person’s driving privileges if it is an inaccurate statement of law, misleading, or confusing when considered in its context as a whole.” 

"Although here the officer’s search-warrant advisory did not comply with the exact wording of Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, Nash supports that a deviation is only problematic if it is an inaccurate statement of law, misleading, or confusing in its context. 989 N.W.2d at 711. Here, the officer’s advisory was legally accurate and properly advised appellant of the consequences of his refusal. The officer testified that at the jail and prior to applying for a search warrant, he asked appellant whether he preferred a blood or urine test, to which appellant responded that he would provide neither. After applying for and receiving a search warrant, the officer told appellant that he had obtained a signed search warrant for appellant’s blood or urine, and that refusing to submit to the search warrant was a crime."

"The plain language of subdivision 2 does not require law enforcement to separately direct the tests. A peace officer who directs a test “shall direct a blood or urine test as provided in the warrant,” and if the warrant authorizes both, the peace officer “may direct whether the test is ofblood or urine.” Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 2 (emphasis added). If a person objects to one test, the peace officer shall offer the other test. Id. The statute does not prohibit a peace officer from simultaneously offering a urine or a blood test. “Action may be taken against a person who refuses to take a blood test only if a urine test was offered and action may be taken against a person who refuses to take a urine test only if a blood test was offered.” Id. Here, the officer testified to offering both types of tests to appellant before the officer obtained a search warrant. After obtaining the warrant, the officer again indicated to appellant that both tests were authorized by the search warrant before informing appellant that refusal to comply with the search warrant was a crime. The officer therefore complied with the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 2."

Moral Of The Story: Close enough for government work. 

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Graham (Decided November 27, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the unintentional destruction of the squad video does not violate Due Process.

Mr. Graham was charged with second-degree DWI and he challenged the stop and arrest.  The arresting officer testified that he observed Mr. Graham drive his vehicle over the fog line and make a "sloppy right turn, and cross into oncoming traffic before correcting into the proper lane. The arresting officer testified that his squad car’s video system automatically activates when an officer turns on the vehicle’s emergency lights, and the captured footage will often include a few minutes of video prior to the activation of the lights. He further testified he believed Graham’s driving conduct was automatically recorded by the squad camera.

Defense counsel was then given leave by the Court to obtain a copy of the squad video. The state later informed the district court that the squad video did not exist and requested that the record be closed.  Graham moved the district court to dismiss the charges, arguing that the loss or destruction of the squad video constituted a due-process violation. The district court held a second omnibus hearing and received testimony from the arresting officer and his chief of police.

The police chief testified testified that he oversees the sergeants assigned to managing, transferring, and storing videos; that he searched for and could not locate the video recording of Graham’s traffic stop; and that all recordings labeled as medical calls were “deleted for 2019 to free up some space on our server.” He testified that “it’s to the point where test recordings, traffic warnings and medicals take up a lot of space on our internal storage, and it’s my belief that after a year or two if there haven’t been any complaints” then “we just delete them,” and that “[t]he only person in our department that has the password to remove the files [is] myself.” He testified, “I might have deleted it if it was labeled as a test recording, as a medical or as a traffic warning.”

The district court denied Graham’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that there was “an equal likelihood the squad video could have inculpated [Graham] as it could have exculpated him.” The district court determined that the squad video was not destroyed in bad faith, that the exculpatory value of the evidence was not apparent "at the time of destruction".

On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the district court stating:

"In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held “that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Thus, “[u]nder Brady, the suppression by the [s]tate, whether intentional or not, of material evidence favorable to the defendant violates the constitutional guarantee of due process.” Walen v. State, 111 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Minn. 2010)."

"The three elements of a Brady violation are: “(1) the evidence must be favorable to the defendant because it would have been either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the prosecution, intentionally or otherwise; and (3) the evidence must be material—in other words, the absence of the evidence must have caused prejudice to the defendant.” Id. If evidence that is only potentially useful to a defendant is destroyed, then the defendant must show bad faith on the part of the state to establish a due-process violation. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51,58 (1988)."

*    *    *

"The district court reasoned that the video was not material because there was an equal likelihood that the video was inculpatory, and not exculpatory...The district court’s reasoning is sound, and we agree that the video was not “material.” There must be something beyond mere “hope” that the destroyed evidence could be exculpatory before it will be protected as the type of “material exculpatory evidence addressed in Brady”.

"Because the video was not material and was only “potentially useful,” Graham must show bad faith on the part of the state to succeed on his due-process claim. The United States Supreme Court and the Minnesota Supreme Court have identified two indices of bad faith: (1) the state’s purposeful destruction of evidence favorable to a defendant so as to conceal it; and (2) the state’s failure to follow standard procedures when destroying evidence. Hawkinson, 829 N.W.2d at 373."

"The record does not support a conclusion that the state purposely destroyed the video.  The district court expressly found that “while the video may have been destroyed due to mistake or gross negligence, the [c]ourt does not find the video was intentionally destroyed.” And the circumstances do not suggest that the state was attempting to conceal the video. In fact, but for Officer Etshokin’s testimony at the initial omnibus hearing, which revealed the existence of the video, Graham would not have known about the video. Nor does the record support a conclusion that the state failed to follow standard procedures when it destroyed the video."

"In sum, because the video was not “material” and the record does not show that the video was destroyed in bad faith, the district court did not err by denying Graham’s motion to dismiss for a due-process violation."

Moral Of The Story: Counsel should have immediately obtained the squad video as reference thereto is always contained in the police reports.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Baumgartner v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided October 2, 2023, Minnesota Court Of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that where the facts conflict, the lower court's findings prevail.

In Baumgartner, Olivia Police Sergeant Aaron Clouse initiated an investigative traffic stop after observing that a vehicle’s driver’s side brake light failed to illuminate. Mr. Baumgartner was subsequently arrested for DWI and he filed a challenge to the revocation of his license arguing that the officer did not have a basis to make the initial stop.

Officer Clouse testified at the license revocation hearing that he saw Baumgartner’s vehicle activate its righthand turn signal as it approached an intersection. Clouse observed that the vehicle’s turn signal illuminated but not the driver’s side brake light. Clouse testified that it was “very clear” that the driver’s side brake light failed to illuminate. Clouse stopped the vehicle for the equipment violation. Baumgartner testified that his brake lights did not illuminate because he drives manual transmission and prefers to reduce speed by downshifting the vehicle rather than use his brakes.

The district court received the video recording of the stop taken from the camera on Clouse’s squad car into evidence at the hearing. The video shows the passenger’s side brake light illuminate for a moment before the vehicle’s turn signal began blinking. The driver’s side brake light, however, did not illuminate as the passenger’s side light did. The squad video also depicts Baumgartner and Clouse testing the vehicle’s lights after Baumgartner pulled over. As Baumgartner pressed on the brakes of his vehicle, the video shows that the brake lights did not immediately illuminate. Eventually, however, both the driver’s and passenger’s side brake lights illuminated as Baumgartner and Clouse tested the brake lights.

The district court issued an order sustaining the revocation of Baumgartner’s driver’s license. It found that Clouse initiated the traffic stop based on his observation of an equipment violation—that the driver’s side brake light failed to illuminate—and that this observation provided sufficient suspicion to initiate the investigative detention.

On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court noting:

"Clouse’s testimony and the squad video support the district court’s finding. Clouse testified that he stopped Baumgartner’s vehicle because he “observed that the driver’s side [brake] light did not illuminate.” Clouse further explained that this it was “very clear” that the light failed to illuminate as the vehicle slowed down. In addition, the district court determined that “the vehicle[’s] . . . driver’s side brake light did not illuminate” but, “[t]he other taillights, including the passenger’s side brake light, appeared to be in working order.” Our review of the squad video does not leave us with the firm conviction that the district court erred in making this finding. Rather, consistent with Clouse’s testimony, the driver’s side brake light does not appear to illuminate as the passenger’s side brake light does before the turn signal begins to blink."

"Baumgartner directs us to his testimony that he would routinely downshift the manual transmission in the vehicle to avoid braking. The district court, however, discounted Baumgartner’s testimony, determining that Baumgartner’s testimony was “evasive, inconsistent, and not credible at times.” We must we defer to this credibility determination. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (“[D]ue regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”); see also Gada v. Dedefo, 684 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. App. 2004) (“Based on the findings, we must assume that the district court found [the petitioner to be] credible.”); Umphlett v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 533 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Minn. App. 1995) (determining that the district court “implicitly found that officer’s testimony was more credible”), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 30, 1995)."

"We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in its factual finding that Clouse observed the driver’s side brake light malfunction because we defer to the district court’s credibility determinations, do not reweigh conflicting evidence, and there is evidence in the record to support the district court’s finding."

Moral Of The Story: A fact is not a fact until the district court finds that it is.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.